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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a final order denying relief on a petition to modify the
decree in a domestic relations case. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h).

ti

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ISSUES PRESENTED
Point 1. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Petitioner's petition to modify
alimony on the basis that the circumstances of retirement were foreseeable at the time of
the divorce.

Determinative law: '~The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(8)(i).
~

Standard of review: "The determination of the trial court that there has or
has not been a substantial change of circumstances is presumed valid, and
[Utah appellate courts] review the ruling under an abuse of discretion
standard." Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App. 47, 1 10, 997 P.2d 903
(citations, internal quotes and alterations omitted).

Point 2: The trial cou1t erred when it concluded that a showing of "permanent disability"
or "total disability" would be required either to modify the decree or as a prerequisite to
recalculating alimony.
iJ

Determinative law:
The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income. including the
impact of diminished workplace experience resulting from primarily
caring for a child of the payor spouse;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; [and]
(iv) the length of the marriage ....

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) )

Standard of review: "[T]o the extent the district coUit applied an improper
legal standard. [appellate courts] review its decision for correctness.,.
Schroeder v. Utah Atty. General's Office, 2015 UT 77,117,358 P.3d 1075.
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Point 3: The determination that retirement was strictly voluntary and not based upon Mr.
Armendariz's physical difficulties was clearly eIToneous because there was no contrary
evidence.

Determinative law: ""In deciding a case tried without the aid of a jury, the com1
has great leeway in deciding what are the facts as presented by the evidence before
him. However, neither a judge nor a jury is permitted to go outside the evidence to
make a finding."' Iacono v. Hicken, 2011 UT App 377, ,r 20,265 P.3d 116
(quoting Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co., 28 Utah 2d 409, 503 P.2d
850, 852 (1972)).
Standard of review: Utah appellate courts "review challenges to findings
of fact for clear error and will reverse only if the findings are in conflict
with the clear weight of the evidence, or if [the] court has a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT
App 26, ,r 13, 321 P.3d 200 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The finder of fact is not "permitted to go outside the evidence to make a
finding." Iacono v. Hicken, 2011 UT App 377, ,r 20 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
This petition to modify was presented to the Court for argument, briefing, and an
evidentiary hearing. Relevant arguments appear in the following:

1.

Point 1 - An anticipated retirement can be a change in circumstances.

Whether the change in income associated with retirement is "a substantial material
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce" was considered by the
Court in its oral ruling: "the change which the petitioner claims is substantial and material
is no doubt material in terms of income .... " (R. at 1393:9-11.) Although this issue was
not explicitly argued or separately expressed in the Petitioner's argument to the trial
court, the issue was preserved because the trial court specifically considered it. Arbogast

ex rel. Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2008 UT App 277, 111, 191 P.3d
~

39; see also Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41,124,164 P.3d 366 (concluding that an issue
was preserved because the trial court '·was aware" of the issue and specifically resolved it
in a "deliberate manner," even though the trial "court did not have the benefit of the
[appellants'] argument").

Point 2 - To the extent the Court believed that a showing of ''permanent
disability" or total inability to work was required before he could
reasonably retire, the Court did not use the correct analysis or law.
In its ruling, the Comt itself suggested that it would need to find a "pennanent
disability" or that Gary was "unable to work" to modify the alimony award. (R. at

1394:3-4.) Because the trial court specifically considered the issue, it is preserved. See
Arbogast, 2008 UT App. 277 at ii 11. Alternatively, this issue was first raised in the
Court's own ruling and thus the preservation doctrine does not apply. A/bores v.
4
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lll:b'

Bracamontes, 2006 UT App 204~ ,r 4, 138 P.3d 106 ("doctrine does not apply ... when the
alleged error first arises in the lower court's final order or judgment and thus, leaves no
opportunity for the party to object below or to bring issues to the attention of the trial
court. "') .

~

Point 3 -The trial court could not determine that Gary was
underemployed based upon the evidence presented.
The trial court's comment that Gary would need to show that he has '"a permanent
disability and [is] unable to work" was brought up by the trial com1judge in his ruling.
Because the trial court specifically considered the issue, it is preserved. See Arbogast,
2008 UT App. 277 at ,r 11. Alternatively, this issue was first raised in the Court's own
ruling and thus the preservation doctrine does not apply. A/bores v. Bracamontes, 2006
UT App 204, if 4, 138 P.3d 106.
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APPLICABLE LAW
The standard to be applied to a petition to modify an award of alimony is
set forth in the Utah Code:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) (LexisNexis 2017) 1• "[T]he standard to be
applied in determining whether a substantial change in circumstance warrants a
modification of alimony is whether the circumstance was foreseeable at the time
of divorce. Where the circumstances are foreseeable, or may be reasonably
anticipated, modification is not permitted." MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2017 UT
App. 1.36, _

P.3d _ , 2017 WL 3326945.

1 The 2017 amendments do not appear to impact the applicable language.

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STA TEMENT OF THE CASE

Original Trial and Decree
The order appealed from denied a petition to modify the alimony provisions of a
divorce decree to account for the financial changes resulting from retirement. Gary
Armendariz was the Petitioner and Pixie Armendariz was the Respondent. 2 The original
divorce was tried before the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen on February 22, 2005. (R. at
179.) On June 3, 2005, the divorce decree was entered. (R. at 314.)

Pre-trial Modification Filings and Proceedings
On June 24, 2014, Pixie filed a Petition to Modify Decree ofDivorce. 3 (R. at
536.) On September 16, 2014, Gary filed Petitioner's Answer to Petition to Modify and
Counterclaim (hereinafter "Gary's Petition"), requesting that his alimony obligation be
modified or terminated based upon his planned retirement at the end of 2014. (R. at 544.)
A temporary orders hearing on Gary's Petition was heard on February 24, 2015 (R. at
705.) The trial Court declined to enter temporary orders regarding alimony because Rule
106 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the order remain in place until the
final hearing on the matter.
Pixie filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause on February 27, 2015. (R. at 716.)
Gary's original attorney withdrew and Robert L. Froerer appeared on April 7, 2015. A
domestic conference was held on May 1, 2015, but no resolution was achieved. (R. at
808.) The order to show cause was heard on May 4, 2015, before Commissioner David

2 In accordance with the convention often used by the Court, counsel will refer to the parties as "Gary" and "Pixie."
3 This petition appears to be a request that Gary be ordered to pay by direct deposit rather than check because some
checks had bounced.

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

S. Dillon. (R. at 809.) At that hearing, a judgment was granted for unpaid alimony. (R.
at 829.) Contempt for failing to pay alimony was ce11ified to the judge. (Id.) At an
objection hearing on August 10, 2015, the Court confirmed the commissioner's ruling.

(R. at 835.)
Mediation was held on January 13, 2016 and was unsuccessful. (R. at 850). A
final pretrial was heard on February 9, 2016, and the alimony, Gary's contempt, and
attorney fees were certified (with other items which were not argued or addressed at the
hearing). (R. at 854-855.) At a status conference, a half-day trial was set (R. at 973,
1160.); trial was held on July 22, 2017 (R. at 1165.).
The Honorable John R. Morris heard the matter. At trial, Judge Morris dismissed
Pixie's petition and she appears to have not contested or objected to the ruling. (R. at
1301 :18-1302:6.) Pixie's contempt claim which was cettified on May 4, 2015 was heard
with Gary's Petition, and Gary was not held in contempt (R. at .1396:8); this ruling is not
in the final order (See R. at 1180-1183. ).

Trial Testimony
Gary and Pixie testified. (R. at 1165-1166.) Gary testified that at the time of the
divorce he anticipated working until age 65. (R. at 1320:1-4.) He described a head-on
collision while in a light pickup in 1998 (before the divorce) and explained that the
collision broke all of the metatarsal bones in his left foot. (R. at 1310: 14-25.) He
testified that although this healed. "it's never been the same" and that his "toe is always
rubbing up against [his] shoes hard." (R. at 1311:8-15.) Photographs of the foot were
admitted showing discoloration of Gary's feet and his toes which one might opine look
8
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slightly misshapen-agreeing with his testimony about his difficulties with shoes. (The
photographs are part of the record, but were not numbered-scans have been included
with the electronic copy of this brief and the originals are inside a manila envelope in the
binder of Petitioner's Trial Exhibits.) The photographs accurately represent Mr.
Annendariz' s foot from the day before trial. (R. at 1312: 1-11.)
Mr. Annendariz also described shoulder surgeries in both shoulders for torn
rotator cuffs-the right shoulder in 2011 and the left shoulder in 2012. (R. at 1314:1625.) He needed the surgeries because of significant pain and recommendations from his
doctor based on an MRI. (R. at 1316:4-6.) He still had pain in his shoulders at the time
of trial. (R. at 1318: 14-19.) Gary indicated that he "used to like to work on cars all the
time" but he no longer does because "'[i]t's just hard on [his] shoulders." (R. at 1322:918.)

Gary also testified that he tried to work for about five months at Lowe's three days
a week for about 20 or 25 hours per week. (R. at 1322:19-24, 1323:19-21, 1348:10-11.)
He thought it would be lighter work that he could handle with his injuries. (R. at
1324:18-22.) He also took the job because his retirement was not yet calculated and was
only being paid in part. (R. at 1324:22-23.) Gary testified that he left Lowe's ''Because I
just couldn't do it anymore. I just couldn't take it. My foot was really bothering me quite
a bit." (R. at 1325:2-3.) His shoulders also bothered him at Lowes. (R. at 1325:6-9.)
Although he had hoped working part-time would allow him to work, it turned out it was
too painful. (R. at 1325:16-1326:4.)

9
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The remainder of Gary's testimony related generally to income. Pixie's trial
testimony related to her ability to work, her expenses and her income. Pixie provided no
testimony or evidence relating to Gary's ability to work. After Pixie's testimony, the
parties rested and counsel made closing arguments. The Court ruled from the bench after
a sh011 recess.

Ruling and Order
Judge Mon-is's ruling and the order focus on the foreseeability of retirement. The
Court initially ruled as though the decree was based upon a stipulation and concluded that
the parties intended for retirement to not affect the alimony award. (R. at 1391: 11-17,

1391 :20-1392:4.) After being informed that the decree was based on a trial, the Court
ruled that the decree specified the statutorily defined events that would terminate alimony
and that the Coutt did not add retirement. (R. at 13 92: 8-15.) The Court concluded that
"the likelihood that [Gary] would at some point retire was pretty certain" at the time of
~

the decree (R. at 1392:16-18) and that at the time of the decree "that the Court then fully
intended for the alimony to continue until" (R. at 1393: 2-5) "[Pixie's] remarriage, her
creation of a cohabitation relationship with a person of either sex or her death~' (R. at
430-431, Decree at para. 22).
Although not included in the final order, the Court indicated that the change in
income was "material" but expressed the Court's view that Gary's retirement was
voluntary. (R. at 1393:8-11). The Court's ruling suggests the judge's belief that a
determination that the decision to retire was reasonable required expert testimony, noting
that the Court could not find "a permanent disability." (R. at 1393:15-1393:4.) The
IO
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Court ruled that Gary's decision to retire, "should not be the basis of a substantial material
change absent more." (R. at 1394: 16-17.) From context. "more" in this statement appears
to mean a showing of medical inability to work or "permanent disability." (See R. at
1393: 15-1394:4, 16-17.)
Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 1184-1191) and an Order
on Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce (R. at 1180-83) entered on November 2, 2016.

II
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point 1: The circumstances of retirement were not foreseeable.

Looking at what has happened since the entry of a decree with 20/20 hindsight and
concluding that everything that has happened was foreseeable in the eyes of an
experienced judge is not the meaning of the statute giving jurisdiction for a petition to
modify alimony. Foreseeability should either be considered in terms of what was or
could be presented to the judge and could as a result of that presentation was foreseeable.
Where there is a retirement divided by a divorce decree, the financial circumstances that
will apply when retirement are frequently not foreseeable because the parties do not
know when they will retire and do not know all of the other details upon which retirement
is premised.
MacDonald, one of the most recent cases decided conflicts with prior casesBolliger which it considered and Young which was not analyzed. The Court can

hannonize all of these cases by specifying that the focus is not on the mere fact of
retirement or social security but rather is on the concomitant details of finances, need, and
ability to pay. These finer details were not, typically, foreseeable by the parties or the
trial comt at the time of divorce. The Court should conclude that the financial
circumstances surrounding Appellant's retirement were not foreseeable and constitute a
substantial material change in circumstances.

13
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Point 2: After finding that the financial changes justify modification, the Court does not
need to address whether retirement was reasonable but should apply the alimony factors.
There is no need for the trial court to take up questions of reasonableness or
necessity of retirement. Once a substantial material change has been found, the trial
court's next step is to analyze the statutory factors for calculating alimony. Because
these factors include need and ability to work and pay, trial courts can and should simply
take up these factors and assess how much a party is able to earn if appropriate.

Point 3: The Trial Court disregarded the only evidence regarding Gary's ability to work
and the mandate should instruct that the only evidence shows Gary cannot hold
employment like his previous employment.
The only evidence regarding Gary's ability to work came from Gary. That
evidence as summed up below showed that he had serious surgeries on his shoulders and
a serious injury to his left foot and that he experienced substantial pain and discomfo11 in
connection with these injuries. After retiring, Gary tried working at Lowes and found it
too difficult. Gary testified that he had stopped repairing cars as a hobby because it
caused him too much pain. Gary's minor concessions that he was looking forward to
retirement do not show that he could work. Appellee could have collected and presented
evidence to contradict or rebut this showing that Gary could work but did not. On this
record, the Court could not conclude that Gary was able to work at his former
employment or in similar employment and the mandate should direct such a finding.

14
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ARGUMENT

Point 1:

The trial court abused its discretion by denying
.Petitioner's petition to modify alimony on the basis that
the circumstances of retirement were foreseeable at the
time of the divorce.

"It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future." 4 But regarding

hindsight, it has been said "[i]n retrospect, almost anything is foreseeable .... " Majumdar
v. Lurie, 653 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ill. App. 1995) (citation omitted). This quote suggests
that although prognosticating the future is very difficult, when looking back on the past
we often assume that the actual sequence of events was predictable. '"Hindsight bias" is a
known problem in assessing what someone else could have been foreseen at a past time.

See e.g. Adams v. Laboratory Corporation ofAmerica, 760 F.3d 1322, 1335 and n. 7
(11th Cir. 2014) ("Hindsight bias is a common-sense concept-everyone knows that
"hindsight is 20/20.").
Modification of alimony is governed by statute:
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new
orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) . There are at least two lines of cases current in Utah
law regarding the meaning of "not foreseeable at the time of divorce.'' This case squarely
presents the Court an opportunity to further distinguish or abandon the older
interpretation or to harmonize the older case law with the meaning of the statute.

4 This pithy phrase has been given attributions that range from Nobel laureate Niels Bohr to baseball player Yogi
Berra. The best-documented attribution that can be found at this time is an anonymous Danish politician in about
1938. See https://guoteinvestigator.com/2013/10/20/no-predict/ (last visited 9/7/2017); see also 2006, The Yale
Book of Quotations by Fred R. Shapiro, Section Niels Bohr, Quote Page 92. Yale University Press, New Haven.
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The cases which sum up the two approaches currently extant in the case law are
Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, 201 P.3d 301 (cert. denied by 201 P.3d 301) (eligibility
for Social Security benefits constituted a substantial change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of divorce) and MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2017 UT App. 136,
_

P.3d _ , 2017 WL 3326945 (strictly interpreting statute, suggesting a very broad

interpretation of ''foreseeable," and distinguishing the key case upon which Young was
premised). As set out below, Appellant should prevail under either approach.
( 1) Young and Bolliger.
Young v. Young addressed whether becoming eligible for Social Security benefits
about one year after entry of a decree constituted a "'substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce"' as required by the alimony
modification statute. 2009 UT App 3, iJ 9 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)
(Supp.2008)). Relying on Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, iJ 20, 997 P.2d 903, the
court ruled that "receipt of social security benefits can constitute a substantial material
change in circumstances for alimony modification purposes, so long as not expressly
foreseen in the original decree of divorce." Young, 2009 UT App 3~ iJ 9. Young also
stated that··[ c]ourts may modify alimony based on such benefits when 'the entitlement
and actual amounts of the benefits become definite."' Id. (quoting Bolliger, 2000 UT
App 47, iJ 20; Bolliger in tum quoted Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah
Ct.App.1990) ).
As explored further in the next section, MacDonald expressly abandoned the
statements in Bolliger and ruled that the plain language of the statute was incompatible
16
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with the Bolliger analysis. Bolliger relied upon cases from before the "not foreseeable"
language was added to the alimony statute and includes a footnote suggesting that the
scope and meaning of "not foreseeable" was not fully briefed by the patties. 2000 UT
App 4 7, ,r 11, n. 3. The language in Bolliger turns from foreseeability at the time of the
decree to the distinct question of whether the change was '~contemplated in the decree
itself." Id. (emphasis, internal quotes, and citations omitted). Bolliger stated in dicta that
the panel believed that the pre-1995 amendment "jurisprudence is sound and grounded in
principles of res judicata." Id. at n. 3.
Under Young and Bolliger, it seems relatively trivial to determine that Gary's
modification request meets the standard of a change "not contemplated in the decree
itself." Here, the decree specified an alimony award and described a Woodward share in
retirement, but did not specify what would occur at the time of retirement. The parties
were divorced in June of 2005 (R. at 324) and the decree does not specifically address the
value or expected payments from any retirement accounts. 5
The alimony award is in paragraph 22 and states as follows:
The indeterminate alimony awarded to the respondent shall be for a term not
exceeding the term of the parties' manfage. The parties were rnan-ied for 28 years
and 11 months (34 7 months). This indeterminate alimony award shall terminate
earlier upon the respondent's remarriage, her creation of a cohabitation
relationship with a person of either sex or her death. This indeterminate alimony
award is otherwise subject to modification by operation of law.

5 [ndeed, Gary's recollection is that what would happen at the time ofretirement was mentioned to the Court at the
time of the original decree and the Court indicated that the changes in income would be assessed at that time.
Unfortunately, the Court does not retain the audio recordings of hearings for this long and they are no longer
available to make part of the record.
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(R. at 322-23.) The next paragraph also requires maintenance of several life insurance
policies apparently as a supplement to alimony. (R. at 323.) The provision related to
Gary's retirement is in paragraph 19 and reads as follows:
The respondent is awarded a 50% distributive share of the petitioner's federal
civilian employment civil service retirement account as of and not beyond the
entry date of the decree of divorce in this action. The respondent shall be solely
responsible for the preparation of the required distribution order and should
prepare and process this distribution order without financial participation from the
petitioner.

(R. at 322.)
The "'res judicata" reference in Bolliger (at n. 3) is a hint at why the Bolliger rule
came into existence in the first place. Bolliger suggests that if something was not
presented to the trial Court, then the issue should still be available for determination. The
express terms of the statute create interfere with this approach until one shifts attention to
whether the issues were capable of presentation before the time of divorce. Utah case
law suggests that before the time of retirement a modification request is not ripe-the
premise being that before the employment status changes there has not been a change in
circumstances. Adamson v. Adamson, 2002 UT App 419 ( unpublished). It is not much
of a stretch to conclude that in most cases what should occur at retirement in regards to
alimony is similarly not ripe at the time of the original decree. A rule that precludes
modification of alimony at the time of retirement on the assumption that the parties
~

should have addressed it or that the Court should have ruled on it is harsh and fails to
recognize the realities of divorce proceedings and retirement: typically parties do not
(.iJ
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know what the consequences of retirement will be until they actually select a retirement

ii

date and retire.
Under Young, social security eligibility accruing merely one year after the entry of
the decree meets the statutory "not foreseeable" requirement. The retirement in this case
which occurred about ten years after the decree-and which looks much like Bolliger
itself.-should meet the threshold. If Young remains good case law, the Court should rule
that the court abused its discretion when it determined that there was no material change
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

(2) MacDonald
MacDonald states that the rule in .Bolliger is no longer good law. MacDonald did
not address the Young decision. "[A] change in circumstances, even a substantial one,
can only fotm the basis for the modification of alimony if that circumstance was not

foreseeable-as opposed to actually foreseen-' at the time of the divorce."'
MacDonald,

ir 12.

"[A ]s it pe11ains to alimony, only a substantial material change in

circumstances not foreseeable, i.e., not reasonably capable of being anticipated at the
time the decree was entered, qualifies as a basis for modification." Id.
A cursory read of MacDonald suggests a very broad view of what would be
"foreseeable"-with a matching narrowing of what changes in circumstances would
permit modification. The least restrained construction of this rule would invalidate many
prior cases-not just Bolliger. MacDonald insists that the question to be determined is
whether the substantial material change in circumstances is "not reasonably capable of
being anticipated at the time the decree was entered." Id. at , 12.
19
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Careful application of this plain language rule could still leave the outcomes of
many existing cases within the trial couit's discretion. The key is the level of detail at
which the matter must be foreseeable-when talking generally about the foreseeability of
retirement, there is no question that it is foreseeable. When looking more closely at the
financial consequences and timing of retirement, they may or may not have been
foreseeable. This distinction makes the outcome of Young still possible-even if the rule
from Young is no longer appropriate because the .financial impact ofSocial Security
eligibility was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
Christensen is a recent case which assesses the facts at the level of detail which

should apply when determining whether retirement constitutes a change in circumstances
and whether it was foreseeable. Christensen v. Christensen, 2017 UT App 120, _

P.3d

_ , 2017 WL 3097594. In Christensen, the trial court specifically considered the
change in income which resulted from retirement. Id. at ,r 23. There, the wife's monthly
income increased from $1,365 to $1,640 and the husband's monthly income decreased
from $4,749 to $3,037.33-but husband's monthly expenses also decreased. Id. The
trial comt made a factual determination that the change in income was not a substantial
change in circumstances justifying modification. The analysis of Christensen appears
compatible with either line of cases-the question the Comt addressed was whether the
actual changes in income were substantial material changes which were not foreseeable.
Here, Gary's income decreased from $5,000 per month at the time of the decree
(R. at 316, para. 5) to $2,976.22 from his retirement and other income (including $900 in
rent before paying a $563 mortgage and rental expenses). (R. at 988, 990; R. at 1334:1920
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1335:3.) Gary's net income after taxes was $2,494.87. (R. at 989.) Similarly, Pixie's
actual net income increased by $970 (See R. at 1359:4-6.) In the original trial, she was
imputed $900 per month (R. at 316). Thus, the total of her actual and imputed income at
the time of the modification hearing had more than doubled to $1.,870-and additional
imputed income may well be appropriate as a result of increases to the federal minimum
wage.
These details were not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Indeed, the record
suggests that the parties (and United States Office of Personnel Management) were not
able to predict the dollar amounts of these retirements until OPM had actually calculated
them in 2015, after his retirement. (R. at 1327:4-1328:2; see also R. at 1078.) OPM even
sent a letter indicating it was calculating and did not know the dollar amounts of Gary's
retirement and that he would be paid $989 until the amounts were calculated. (R. at
1078.) This appears to have taken from February 2015 until April or June of 2015 (R. at
1078, 1082, 1328:3-8.) If OPM did not know the amount of retirement at the time of
retirement, it goes without saying that the parties and the trial court did not know these
details ten years earlier at the time of divorce.
The trial court conceded that the changes in income were material: "the change
which the petitioner claims is substantial and material is no doubt material in terms of
income." (R. at 1393:9-11.) This left the question of foreseeability. The parties could
not have predicted in 2005 what the financial impact of Gary's retirement would be. That
Gary would most likely retire and that Pixie would likely receive a substantial portion of
his retirement were foreseeable at that time. The actual amounts were not known and
21
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could not be predicted. The amount of his retirement was contingent on future factors
that could not easily be predicted and could not be presented to the trial court at that time,
such as Gary's income during the final years before his retirement and his years of
employment. No one was able to foresee with any level of certainty the outcome of these
details-only that these future unknowns would determine the value of the retirement if
Gary qualified for a retirement.
The Com1 also commented that the decree's statement that alimony would
terminate upon "rema1Tiage.... cohabitation ... or death" indicated that the Court had
analyzed and determined in 2005 that alimony should not be terminated at retirement.
(R. at 1293:2-5; referencing R. at 322-323.) Appellant disagrees with the trial court's
comment in this regard. The inclusion of this language was not reasoned or based upon
analysis. It does not indicate a decision that alimony should absolutely continue after
retirement. This clause was a bare restatement of the default statutory rule which is still
in place and is cun-ently codified at Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-5(9) and (10)-ifthis were
not included, the same events would terminate alimony. Absent some deviation or
additional statement in the decree, it cannot be concluded that the original Decree of
Divorce analyzed the implications of retirement and determined that modification should
not be permitted.
Because the financial impact and timing of retirement was "not reasonably capable
of being anticipated at the time the decree was entered" the trial court's determination
that there was no change in circumstances was an abuse of discretion. The Court should
determine that the facts showed a change in circumstances which was not foreseeable as

22
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required by the statute and should reverse the trial court's detennination and remand for
the trial court to analyze the financial situations of the parties and calculate the need and
ability to pay of the parties.

(3) Ruling that the correct analysis involves foreseeability ofthe
actual financial implications and timing ofretirement and
similarfuture changes harmonizes the rules and outcomes in
Young and MacDonald.
As noted above, either analytical path results in a remand to the trial court for
additional proceedings regarding the parties' need and ability to pay. A mling clarifying
that the foreseeability requirement should include analysis of whether the financial

impacts of retirement or other substantial material changes were "reasonably capable of
being anticipated at the time the decree" would create analysis that could result in the
affinned decisions in Young and MacDonald. In a case where the parties knew and
presented to the trial court the probable dollar amounts of the financial impact of
retirement, a ruling that the change was foreseeable would be appropriate. In the vast
majority of cases, it seems likely that the financial details of retirement would not be
foreseeable and the trial cou11 analysis would focus on whether the dollar amounts
actually constituted a substantial material change-similar to the analysis in Christensen,
2017 UT App 120, which took up all of the dollar amount increases and decreases and
properly determined that the changes were not significant enough to justify modification.
Under this rule, foreseeability would turn on whether the parties knew or "could
reasonably anticipate·' the change in income associated with retirement, receipt of Social
Security and other such events which are known to the parties but only in a vague way.
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In this way, the rules espoused by Young and Bolliger could be cleared aside without
abrogating principles that suggest the outcomes of those cases were appropriate on their
facts. The mies in Young and Bolliger address the question "did the trial court consider
<.ill

this change in making the decree?" Following the MacDonald analysis but clarifying
that the court should address foreseeability puts the actual financial details known at the
time of the divorce under scrutiny. This change leads to a similar rule: could the parties

~

and Court reasonably anticipate at the time of the divorce that their incomes would
change to be these amounts?
To put it another way, Bolliger and Young could merely be modified to assess
whether the trial court "[could have] foreseen" (compare Young, 2009 UT App 3 at 110
("so long as not expressly foreseen in the original decree") and whether the changed
circumstances could Hnot [have been] contemplated in the decree itself' (compare
Bolliger) because the details were not known to the parties or the court. This clarification

of MacDonald's plain language analysis would permit Young and Bolliger to be decided
on their facts exactly as they were before the trial courts and would allow modification in
future cases depending on the actual circumstances. This rule continues to emphasize the
plain meaning of the statute as mandated by MacDonald but does not leave the parties at
the mercy of unforeseeable consequences offoreseeable events.

24
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Point 2:

After finding a change in circumstances, the proper
analysis involves taking up the alimony factors and no
finding of "permanent disability" or "total disability" is
required.

On remand, the trial court's prior determination that Gary had to show medical
disability, "permanent disability" or ··total disability" will result in a dismissal of his
petition absent some guidance from this Court. The key issue to be addressed in
connection with a decision to retire is not whether the retiree could have kept working.
After finding that the financial circumstances of retirement justify modification, the Court
should consider the entirety of the evidence presented and analyze the circumstances
rather than peremptorily concluding that some showing of medical inability to work is
required. Indeed, this is suggested by the cases which indicate that the correct analysis
on modification is the same as on establishment of alimony as set out in Utah Code Ann.

§ 30-3-5(8)(a). See e.g. Hansen v. Hansen, 2014 lJT App 96, 16, 325 P.3d 864 (citations
omitted)(indicating that the statutory factors must be considered in connection with a
petition to modify).
Even if Utah courts might look to whether the decision to retire was reasonable.

See e.g. Nicholson v. Nicholson, 2017 UT App 155, 1 11 (movant "retired at a reasonable
retirement age"). Other than this reference in Nicholson counsel can find no case law in
Utah specifically addressing alimony and a voluntary decision to retire. Appellant
suggests that the Comt should not engage in a head-on assessment of the decision to
retire unless there is direct evidence that the decision to retire is motivated by an attempt
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to avoid alimony or that the decision was completely unreasonable (for example if
another year would significantly increase the retirement benefits).
Categorically dete1mining that the retirement was a bad decision and denying
modification on that basis does not recognize the actual facts applicable to the parties.
Rather than analyzing the reasonableness of the retirement. the Court can address the
issue of whether alimony should continue by assessing the matter in the context of need
and ability to pay as set out in the statute. The standard imputation analysis is adequate
to determine if and how much the spouse could earn in addition to his or her retirement.

See e.g. Christensen, 2017 UT App 120, 112-28, 31 (analyzing a request to modify
alimony after a voluntary and concluding that the appellant was "capable of employment
and was voluntarily underemployed" and imputing income at the rate from when the
parties divorced). Christensen involved a teacher who retired at 58 with a college degree
and expressed that he "wishe[ d] to enjoy retirement and stay at home with the children."

Id. Christensen also involved child support which has a statutory imputation requirement.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(8).
The Court should remand this matter with instructions to assess the statutory
elements including the parties' need and ability to pay without engaging in an analysis of
the decision to retire. If the Comt is permitted to assess the decision to retire, it should be
limited to assessing reasonableness of that decision and should be instructed that a
showing of "permanent disability" or '"total disability" is not required to modify alimony.
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Point 3:

The evidence presented to the Court did not permit the
finding that Gary's retirement was strictly voluntary
because the only evidence presented to the Court showed
that Gary experienced significant pain and difficulties
associated with work and Appellee presented no contrary
evidence.

There is no obligation to present an expe1t to show that Gary experienced
significant pain in connection with physical labor. Indeed, experts are ill-equipped to
assess this subjective issue. Pixie presented substantially similar evidence in connection
with her own position that she is not able to earn. If a party wishes to take issue with the
other patty's evidence that they struggle to work, the rules provide methods of countering
this evidence-for example, rnle 35 permits a request for "a physical or mental
examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner." Utah R. Civ. P. 35. Pixie
chose not to seek this. The trial comt cannot disregard the only evidence presented that a
party has physical difficulties with working when there is no contrary evidence that the
party can work. See Iacono v. Hicken, 2011 UT App. 377,, 20 (trial comt cannot "go
outside the evidence" to make a finding).
The evidence presented to the Court was that Gary had a head-on collision in 1998
which broke all of the metatarsal bones in his left foot. (R. at 1310:14-25.) That foot has
"never been the same" and his "toe is always rubbing up against [his] shoes hard." (R. at
1311 :8-15.) Photographs showed this injury. (Photographs in the binder of Petitioner's

Trial Exhibits.) The Court was also told of Gary's shoulder surgeries in both shoulders
for torn rotator cuffs-the right shoulder in 2011 and the left shoulder in 2012. (R. at
1314: 16-25.) Gary still had pain in his shoulders at the time of trial. (R. at 1318: 14-19.)
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Gary ''used to like to work on cars all the time" as a hobby but the he no longer does
because "[i]fsjust hard on [his] shoulders." (R. at 1322:9-18.)
Gary tried to work for about five months at Lowe's three days a week for about 20
or 25 hours per week. (R. at 1322: 19-24, 1323: 19-21, 1348: l 0-11.) He thought it would
be lighter work that he could handle with his injuries. (R. at 1324: 18-22.) Gary left
Lowe's because, he said, "I just couldn't do it anymore. I just couldn't take it. My foot
was really bothering me quite a bit." (R. at 1325:2-3.) His shoulders also bothered him
at Lowes. (R. at 1325:6-9.) Although he had hoped working part time would permit him
to work, it turned out it was too painful. (R. at 1325:16-1326:4.)
Cross examination yielded the following regarding ability to work:
Gary is 62. (R. at 1339:3-4.) He was not forced to retire and had not been written up at
work. (R. at 1342:21-22, 1343:2-3.) Gary admitted he could still be working there ifhe
chose. (R. at 1343:4-5.) Finally, Gary conceded that at the time he retired he was
looking fonvard to being home with and spending time with his now-deceased wife. (R.
at 1347:23-1348:9.) Cross and redirect together also showed that if Gary changed jobs
on base~ if even possible without being disqualified and forced to retire, it would have
canied the same problems with his foot and shoulders and wou]d have resulted in a
reduction in his income (R. at 1343:10-13, R. at 1350:24-1351:18.)
None of this evidence suggests that Gary is as able to work as he did at the time of
the divorce. All in all, this evidence suggests that his decision to retire was motivated by
pain and difficulty with work. On this record, the Court simply could not conclude that
iJjj

Gary can or should continue to work in the employment he has had in the past. There is
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no evidence of other employment he is qualified for or could take. The evidence
regarding his difficulties at Lowes shows that other employment in retail or other such
work on his feet would carry the same problems. Absent some other evidence that Gary
could work or that he actually does not have the pain he describes, the Court's opinion
that Gary should continue to work was based on little more than the judge's own opinion
regarding what a laborer's work ethic should be. Pixie could have had a doctor look at
Gary or could have presented evidence from a vocational rehabilitation expert but did not
and the Court needs to mle within the record presented.
Because the record presents the trial court with no evidence that Gary would be
able to take another job and work without substantial pain, the Court should mandate on
remand that Gary not be imputed income from work.

CONCLUSION
The Court should rule that the trial cout1 abused its discretion in determining that
the changes in Gary's and Pixie's incomes and the situation at the time of retirement was
foreseeable and declining to hear his petition to modify. The Court should mle that there
was a substantial and material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce and remand for the trial court to make rulings regarding the alimony factors in
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a). The Court should give the trial court instruction for
remand that analysis of the decision to retire is not required and that the trial court should
simply perfom1 the analysis from 30-3-5{8)(a). Finally, the Coutt should find that the
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record will not support a determination that Gary is voluntarily underemployed and
should determine that the trial courf s conclusion in this regard is clearly en-oneous.

Respectfully submitted this 8th day of September, 2017.

3:l~0 67~
Attorney for Petitioner I Appellant

~
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ADDENDUM
1.

· Excerpt from Transcript of Coutt's Oral Rulings (R. 1390-97).

2.

Order on Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, dated November 2, 2016.

3.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated November 2, 2016.
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1

petition to modify as I previously described.
THE COURT:

2

Okay.

Thank you.

I do have an afternoon

3

calendar so I'm just going to take a few minutes and I'll be

4

back in and rule.

5

(Recess was taken.)

6

Okay.

7

decided to reset.

8

right.

9

particular case.

I guess I was out too long.
Let me get logged in again.

Well, as indicated,

Everything
Okay.

All

I'm intending to rule in this

Just by way of background, Mr. Neeley's

10

petition to modify was dismissed earlier this morning.

11

remaining to be discussed is Mr. Froerer's counterclaim.

12

Actually you didn't write it so I'm going to say the petitioner

13

of the original case is Gary Armendariz counterclaim which he

14

included in his answer to his petition to modify which involves

15

the issue of alimony and whether or not it should be modified,

16

either an amount or duration.

17

And

And there's an issue addressed in the answer of

18

petitioner's contempt, and it was briefed even though that was

19

not part of the counterclaim,

20

economy.

21

to deal with the issues of contempt and arrearages.

22

just as a matter of judicial

And because I have continuing jurisdiction I am going

Now, Mr. Froerer cited the Bolinger case at great

23

length.

24

the very first cites I have.

25

from that case in my bench -- I guess my bench book, the

I will have to tell you in my own notes that is one of
And I have quite a few quotes
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1

domestic piece of it involving petitions to modify.

2

quotes all go to substantial material change in circumstances.

And the

Now, in order for the counterclaim to prevail Mr.

3

4

Froerer must show substantial material change in circumstances

5

not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

6

the language of all the case law is not foreseeable at the time

7

of the divorce.

8

that's the most significant change.

9

case goes, you know, it's got some great quotes in it, but I

10

And I point out

It doesn't say not addressed.

And I think

As far as the Bolinger

think it goes too far and is distinguishable here.
First of all, we have in this case -- there wasn't a

11

12

trial originally in Bolinger and so many of those cases -- or

13

there was a trial.

14

property division and an award of alimony and other provisions

15

as well.

16

its conditions was stipulated.

17

parties.

18

you were involved.

19

but

20

And here we have a stipulated decree and

So the situation here is that the decree and all of
It was negotiated among the

And I don't know -- I don't remember, Mr. Neeley, if

okay.

I know, Mr. Froerer, you weren't initially,

Mr. Neeley says he wasn't involved.

The settlement and the terms of the decree were,

21

again, negotiated by parties who were represented, presumed

22

negotiated in good faith.

23

the belief that the parties negotiated having, you know, a

24

complete understanding of their assets and circumstances and

25

prospects at the time.

And along with the presumption is

COURT CERTIFIED DOCUMENT
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1

There's also a presumption that, you know, because

2

they were negotiating in good faith, they intended actually to

3

comply with the agreement and would do anything reasonable in

4

order to so comply.

5

Now -- so --

MR. FROERER:

Your Honor, I know this is unusual, but

6

according to the decree this was a trial, not a negotiated

7

settlement.

8
9

THE COURT:

Okay.

Was it a trial?

All right.

Fine.

Then we'll strike that part, but it doesn't change my

10

conclusion.

11

infer what was intended by the contents of the decree.

12

decree specifically addressed the allocation of the parties'

13

retirement income.

14

alimony would terminate on the happening of three events.

15

did not include a fourth,

16

And my conclusion is very simple.

That one has to
And the

The decree also specifically stated that
It

retirement.

Given the petitioner's length of service at Hill,

17

certainly the length of their marriage, the likelihood that he

18

would at some point retire was pretty certain, and even though

19

it may not have been specifically stated, the standard is

20

really not foreseeable at the time of the divorce, or in this

21

particular case since as you point out, there was apparently a

22

trial, then the Court did not specifically call out retirement

23

as an event which would terminate the alimony obligation.

24
25

Although the Court did specifically make an award
which was worded a little differently than what I usually see.
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1

He called it indeterminate.

2

I believe if you read how that was worded in the context of the

3

entire decree, you find that the Court then fully intended for

4

the alimony to continue until one of those three events

5

occurred.

6

else was intended and that the parties argued that it ought to

7

terminate upon retirement.

8
9

And he was referring to time.

And so I also don't have any evidence that anything

So -- but be that as it may, the other concern that I
have is that the change which the petitioner claims is

10

substantial and material is no doubt material in terms of

11

income, but it was voluntary.

12

self-selected the date of his retirement.

13

then meet his obligations was the direct result of that

14

self-selection or that voluntary choice to retire.

15

And

It was a voluntary change.

He

And his ability to

We have absolutely no evidence that he had to retire.

16

We do not have a riff or a reduction in force.

17

strong evidence whatsoever, no persuasive evidence of a

18

debilitating injury to the petitioner.

19

anecdotal statements.

20

aches and pains.

21

regarding a serious accident or regarding the necessity of

22

having multiple rotator cuff surgeries, but whether that

23

disqualified him from continuing to work is his own opinion.

24
25

We have no

We have his own

I think any of us as we age experience

I do not want to discount his testimony

And without having expert medical testimony,

I can't

evaluate anything he says and I can't evaluate the pictures
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1

which were offered and reach a conclusion that any type of

2

condition that nature presented, including rotator cuff

3

surgery, is a permanent disability and he's unable to work.

4

can't reach that conclusion.

I

He's also -- petitioner has also admitted under

5

6

cross-examination that he didn't even seek alternative

7

employment or reassignment.

8

been -- it would have cost immediate income, but he's still

9

accruing years toward his retirement.

I don't believe that would have

He made no efforts to

10

see what could be done and he admitted that.

11

that he had no write ups.

12

quality of his work, his ability to lift, push, pull, whatever

13

heavy objects in the course of his work.

14

decided I'm done.

15

Fine.

He also admitted

Nobody talked to him about the

He basically just

I've had enough and chose to retire.
His choice.

But in so doing he reduced his

16

income.

17

substantial material change absent more.

18

any more.

19

his income, but I think the fact that his retirement was a

20

foreseeable event and the timing was his choice, certainly

21

under those circumstances I can't find that it was substantial,

22

material and under foreseeable.

23

able to create his own substantial material event simply by a

24

choice that isn't grounded in anything else.

25

And his choice should not be the basis of a
And he didn't give

So I have a voluntary retirement and it did reduce

You know a party shouldn't be

So, you know, I'm not discounting pain.

A lot of us
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1

live in pain, particularly as you age.

2

the service he put in, but when he agreed to the alimony --

3

when the alimony was awarded, you know, the fact of retirement

4

was always in front of the Court.

5

certainly in the knowledge of the Court because the Court dealt

6

with the parties' retirements.

7

dealt with both, both parties' retirement income, or they split

8

something up with regard to the respondent.
So I under -- again,

9

And I'm not discounting

It's implicit and was

And as I recall the decree

I'm going to find that the Court

10

doesn't have jurisdiction to modify the decree because I can't

11

find,

you know, the requirements for a modification.

12

said,

I am going to address the rest of it simply for economy

13

so we don't have to be here again or at least in this

14

circumstance.

15

The petitioner has certain arrearages.

Now, as I

An award was

16

previously given.

17

arrearage, the arrearage which has accumulated in alimony sense

18

that time.

19

Mr. Neeley and the counterclaim filed by your predecessor,

20

Mr.

21

That award can be augmented by the present

I've dismissed both the petition to modify filed by

(inaudible) so I'm not awarding attorney's fees for that.
As far as the order to show cause, again, you can't
l..

22

come in after you've made a voluntary choice to reduce your

23

income and then say I don't have the ability to pay because,

24

again, there was a presumption that one work in good faith to

25

meet one's obligations.
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1

So what I will do is also order -- and as far as the

2

retirement goes, I'll order whatever the arrearage is there

3

too.

4

described, Mr. Neeley, include it and give me an order.

5

sign it.

6

fees to the respondent, those fees expended directly in

7

pursuing the order to show cause.

And if, in fact, the statute let's you do what you

I will only award attorney's

And with these awards I'm purging the contempt.

8
9

Have OPM deal with it.

I'll

you get an award.

You don't get anything else.

So

And I'm not

10

inclined to order any jail time or anything like that for

11

contempt.

12

here so.

13

analysis really changes if it was a trial to the Court,

14

have difficulty, you know, determining that no one took this

15

into account at the time when they did deal with retirement in

16

one way and had every opportunity to put it in as a condition

17

terminating the obligation to pay and did not do so.

18

I think that's above and beyond what's called for
And I guess with that and, again,

I don't think my
I still

So, you know, maybe you should work, but I kind of

19

view that as precatory.

20

ordering people to work, but, you know,

it's a choice.

21

she's going to get by on what she gets,

fine.

22

probably a choice.

23

part of any orders I'm going to give.

24

consequences for not meeting obligations, but not consequences

25

for a choice like that so all right.

I don't think courts should go around
If

I think work is

And in many cases a good one, but it's not
There may be
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1

So, Mr. Neeley, can you write that up, please?

2

questions?

3

thought the Bolinger case was almost there, but I

4

as distinguishable.

5

which aren't, you know, foursquare with Bolinger.

6

depends on where you want to go with things,

7

was the good case to argue.

8

day.

9

10

You know and, again,

I find it interesting.

Any
I

just see it

And I have other quotes from other cases
And sort of

I guess, but it

So thank you, gentlemen.

Good

(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)

11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
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ROBERT L. NEELEY [2373]
Attorney for Respondent
2485 Grant Avenue, #200
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone No.: 801.621.3646
Facsimile No.: 801.621.3652

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

GARY LYNN ARMENDARIZ,

ORDER ON PETITION TO
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs
PIXIE MARIE ARMENDARIZ,

Respondent.

Case No.: 044700632
Judge: Morris
Commissioner: Dillon

IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE, a non-jury trial on Petitioner and

Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on regularly for hearing on
July 22, 2016 before the Honorable John R. Morris, District Court Judge. Petitioner was
personally present and represented by his attorney, Robert L. Froerer. Respondent was
personally present and represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley. Petitioner and
Respondent having been sworn in and testified; and the court having received exhibits
from both parties; and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel; and
having reviewed the pleadings on file; and being fully advised in the matter; and has
Order on Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce
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entered its findings of fact; hereby makes the following Order on Petition to Modify
Decree of Divorce:
1.CIRCUMSTANCES: The court does not find a material substantial change of

circumstance warranting a termination of alimony to Respondent in the present
sum of $1319 per month as it was foreseeable at the time of the divorce
Petitioner would retire but made no provision upon his retirement that alimony to
Respondent would terminate.
2.TERMINATION: The court does not have jurisdiction to terminate alimony in

this case as pursuant to U.C.A §30-3-5(8)(i)(i) provides the court has continuing
jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony
based upon a substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at
the time of the divorce. The court concludes that it was foreseeable that
Petitioner would retire but made no adjustment or provision for termination of
alimony upon his retirement.
3.RETIREMENT: The parties Decree of Divorce specifically provides, upon

stipulation of the parties, that Respondent would receive one-half of the
retirement benefits earned by Petitioner during the course of the parties'
marriage relating to his CSRS retirement plan.
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4.The court concludes the parties discussed retirement benefits to be received by
Respondent upon Petitioner's retirement but did not modify, terminate, or amend
the award of alimony to Respondent upon Petitioner's retirement. Petitioner is
ordered to continue to pay Respondent $1319 per month alimony through
October 31, 2034.

Gi

5. The court dismisses for no cause of action Respondent's Petition to have
Petitioner to pay his alimony obligation by transferring from his bank account to
Respondent's bank account the monthly alimony award.
6.JUDGMENT 1: The court awards Respondent judgment against Petitioner for

$7760 for retirement benefits she did not receive from January 1, 2015 through
and including August 31, 2015 for which she was entitled.
7 .JUDGMENT 2: The court awards judgment to Respondent against Petitioner in

the sum of $26,380 for delinquent alimony from January 1, 2015 through and
including August 31, 2016, a total of 20 months payable at $1319 per month.
a.JUDGMENT 3: The court awards Respondent a judgment against Petitioner in

the sum of $675 as and for attorney's fees she incurred in filing an Order to Show
Cause to collect delinquent alimony.
9.Respondent may seek to collect Judgment of $7,760 retirement benefits,
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judgment for attorney fees of $675, and judgment for $26,380 together with

ii>

ongoing (prospective) alimony of $1319 per month from the Office of Personal
Management (OPM) pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code Section 838.225, 838.234 and
838.235.
10.ATTORNEY'S FEES: The court does not award attorney's fees to either party
in connection with the bench trial heard on July 22, 2016.
ENTERED BY THE COURT ON THE DATE AS INDICATED
BY THE COURT'S SEAL ON TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
ISi ROBERT FROERER

1111116

ROBERTFROERER
DATED
Attorney for Petitioner
Electronically signed by Robert L. Neeley
with permission of Robert Froerer.
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ROBERT L. NEELEY [2373]
Attorney for Respondent
2485 Grant Avenue, #200
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone No.: 801.621.3646
Facsimile No.: 801.621.3652

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

GARY LYNN ARMENDARIZ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,

vs
PIXIE MARIE ARMENDARIZ,

Respondent.

Case No.: 044700632
Judge: Morris
Commissioner: Dillon

IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE, a non-jury trial on Petitioner and

Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce came on regularly for hearing on
July 22, 2016 before the Honorable John R. Morris, District Court Judge. Petitioner was
personally present and represented by his attorney, Robert L. Froerer. Respondent was
personally present and represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley. Petitioner and
Respondent having been sworn in and testified; and the court having received exhibits
from both parties; and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel; and
having reviewed the pleadings on file; and being fully advised in the matter; hereby
vi)
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makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.Petitioner and Respondent were divorced in the above-entitled case on June 3,
2005.
2.Pursuant to paragraph 19 of the parties' Decree of Divorce Respondent was
awarded a 50% distributive share of Petitioner's Federal Civilian Employee Civil
Service Retirement System (CSRS) account as of the date of the parties' Decree

~

of Divorce in this action.
3.Pursuant to paragraph 21 of the parties' Decree of Divorce Respondent was
awarded alimony from Petitioner in the sum of $1319 per month commencing
March, 2005.
4.The court finds the parties were married for 28 years and 11 months for a total
of 34 7 months. The indeterminate alimony award to Respondent was granted for
a term, not exceeding, the length of the parties' marriage.
5.Pursuant to paragraph 22 of the parties' Decree of Divorce the indeterminate
alimony award shall terminate early upon the Respondent's remarriage, her
creation of a co-habitation relationship with a person of either sex or upon her
death.
6. The court finds that Respondent has not remarried and is not in a co-habitation
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relationship with a person of either sex and neither party has died.
7.The court finds that it was foreseeable that Petitioner would retire from Hill Air
Force Base and that Respondent would receive a 50% share of Petitioner's Civil
Service Retirement System (CSRS) acquired during the course of the parties'
marriage.
8.Petitioner at the time of the parties' divorce was aware he was going to retire
and that his former spouse, Respondent, would receive a substantial percentage
of his retirement.
9.The parties' Decree of Divorce makes no reference that upon Petitioner's
retirement his obligation to pay alimony would be reduced or otherwise
terminated.
10.The court finds that it was foreseeable to Petitioner he would retire and his
former spouse, Respondent, would receive a large portion of his retirement.
11.The court finds the parties' divorce does not indicate that upon Petitioner's
retirement that his obligation to pay alimony would terminate.
12.The court finds that Petitioner retired on January 1, 2015 from Hill Air Force
Base, Utah and became eligible to receive his Civil Service Retirement known as

Gil

Civil Service Retirement System retirement plan (CSRS).
13.The court finds that Respondent began to receive her court ordered share of
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Petitioner's CSRS retirement on September 1, 2015.

14.The court finds Petitioner received the full share of the retirement and no
funds were withheld until November 1, 2015.
15. The court finds that Respondent has received her share of Petitioner's
retirement commencing September 1, 2015 in the correct amount of $1327.78
minus survival benefit premium and tax deductions resulting in a net monthly pay
of $970.
16.The court finds Petitioner having received all of his retirement from January 1,
2015 through August 31, 2015 owes Respondent eight months of retirement from
January 1, 2015 through August 31, 2015 in the sum of $970 per month for a
total sum of $7760.
17.The court finds Petitioner has failed to pay alimony to Respondent in the sum
of $1319 per month effective upon his retirement of January 1, 2015 to the
present date.
18.The court finds that a judgment granted on May 4, 2015 for a period of four
months for delinquent alimony in the sum of $5276 (4x1319) and Respondent is
entitled to augment that judgment for the period of May 1, 2015 to August 31,

~

2016, a period of 16 months.
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19.The court finds that Petitioner is delinquent in alimony to Respondent Pixie
Armendariz in the sum of $26,380, a total of 20 months from January 1, 2015
through August 31, 2016.
20.The court finds that Petitioner voluntarily chose to retire on January 1, 2015.
21.The court finds the parties stipulated in their Decree of Divorce that
Respondent was entitled to one-half of Petitioner's CSRS retirement accrued
during the course of the parties' marriage.
22.The court finds that Petitioner incurred attorney's fees of $675 for the Order to
Show Cause held on May 4, 2015 to collect delinquent alimony payments from
January 1, 2015 through April 30, 2015.
The court having entered his Findings of Fact now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ijjj

23.The court does not find a material substantial change of circumstance
warranting a termination of alimony to Respondent in the sum of $1319 per
month as it was foreseeable at the time of the divorce Petitioner would retire but
made no provision upon his retirement that alimony to Respondent would
terminate.
24.The court does not have jurisdiction to terminate alimony in this case as
pursuant to U.C.A §30-3-5(8)(i)(i) provides the court has continuing jurisdiction to
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(iii)

make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based upon a
substantial material change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.

The court concludes that it was foreseeable that Petitioner would retire

but made no adjustment or provision for termination of alimony upon his
retirement.
25.The parties Decree of Divorce specifically provides, upon stipulation of the
parties, that Respondent would receive one-half of the retirement benefits earned
by Petitioner during the course of the parties' marriage relating to his CSRS
retirement plan.
~

26.The court concludes the parties discussed retirement benefits to be received
by Respondent upon Petitioner's retirement but did not modify, terminate, or
amend the award of alimony to Respondent upon Petitioner's retirement.
Petitioner is ordered to continue to pay Respondent $1319 per month alimony
through October 31, 2034.
27.The court dismisses for no cause of action Respondent's Petition have
Petitioner to pay his alimony obligation by transferring from his bank account to
her bank account the monthly alimony award for no cause of action.
28.The court awards Respondent judgment against Petitioner for $7760 for
retirement benefits she did not receive from January 1, 2015 through and
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including August 31, 2015 for which she was entitled.
29.The court awards judgment to Respondent against Petitioner in the sum of
$26,380 for delinquent alimony from January 1, 2015 through and including
August 31, 2016 a total of 20 months payable at $1319 per month.

30.The court awards Respondent a judgment against Petitioner in the sum of
$675 as and for attorney's fees she incurred in filing an Order to Show Cause to
collect delinquent alimony.
31.Respondent may seek to collect Judgment of $7,760 retirement benefits,
judgment for attorney fees of $675, and judgment for $26,380 together with
ongoing (prospective) alimony of $1319 per month from the Office of Personal
Management (OPM) pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code Section 838.225, 838.234 and
838.235.
32.The court does not award attorney's fees to either party in connection with the
bench trial heard on July 22, 2016.
ENTERED BY THE COURT ON THE DATE AS INDICATED
BY THE COURT'S SEAL ON TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT
/S/ ROBERT FROERER

11/1/16

ROBERTFROERER
Attorney for Petitioner

DATED
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Electronically signed by Robert L. Neeley
with permission of Robert Froerer.
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